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STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 











Thomas G. Soucia, Esq. 
Franklin Co~tY,;Pl1i./?Y.c Defender . 




July 2018 decision denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 21-months. 
Agostini, Cruse, Smith 
f I 
Appellant's Brief re~eived December 14, 2018 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the.Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
~m . 
e undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
~
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n · ;; . 1~ 1!; , . 
'.i_.l V':aC:.!lted, remanded fot de novo interv.iew _Modified to 
J • I • ----
Commissioner 
~d _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to----
Commissioner 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on ') g- 'JC/ 
' I 
I 
[)istrihution: Appeals Unit - Appellaq~ ~:.A;rp~llanfs Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (l li.2018) L J , {;~1i . l .. 
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Appellant was sentenced to 20 years to life upon his conviction by plea of two counts of 
Murder in the second degree.  In the instant appeal, Appellant challenges the July 2018 
determination of the Board denying release and imposing a 21-month hold on the following 
grounds: (1) the decision is unlawful because the Board failed to sufficiently consider Appellant’s 
institutional programming, release plans and other factors; (2) the decision is arbitrary and 
capricious, and may have violated due process, because the Board placed too much emphasis on 
the instant offense and Appellant’s criminal history; (3) the decision constitutes an unauthorized 
resentencing; (4) the Board may have “misinterpreted” Appellant’s conviction; (5) the Board failed 
to conduct a future focused risk assessment as required by the 2011 amendments to the Executive 
Law; and (6) the decision fails to provide adequate details.  These arguments are without merit. 
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward 
for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
 
While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner 
is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th 
Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  
The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter 
of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017).  In the absence of 
a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be 
presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 
680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 
A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990). 
 
The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered 
the appropriate factors, including: the instant offenses committed at age 32 and involving the 
murder of Appellant’s father to steal his property followed by the murder of a neighbor while 
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burglarizing his house with a co-defendant; Appellant’s expression of remorse; his criminal 
history; his institutional record including completion of ART, vocational programming, work on 
his GED, and disciplinary record reflecting two new infractions since his last appearance; and 
release plans – which, contrary to Appellant’s claim, were discussed during the interview – to live 
in Ulster County where he will be undomiciled, look for a job, apply for disability benefits, and 
continue outreach to reentry organizations.  The Board also had before it and considered, among 
other things, the sentencing minutes, Appellant’s case plan, the COMPAS instrument, and letters 
of assurance from reentry organizations in NYC. 
 
After considering all required factors and principles, the Board acted within its discretion in 
determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  
In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offenses, Appellant’s receipt 
of additional disciplinary infractions, and negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument and 
indications in the assessment that Appellant may face a number of challenges upon reentry.  See, 
e.g., Matter of Robinson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 162 A.D.3d 1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d 235 (3d 
Dept. 2018); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 
228 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017); Matter of Smith v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 81 A.D.3d 1026, 916 N.Y.S.2d 285 (3d Dept. 2011).  The Board 
encouraged Appellant to remain discipline free and consider preparing a documented release plan to 
increase the likelihood of success upon reentry.  See, e.g., Matter of Delrosario v. Stanford, 140 
A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016). 
 
Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the Board is not precluded from considering or relying on 
an inmate’s criminal behavior on a reappearance release interview.  Matter of Thompson v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 120 A.D.3d 1518, 1518-19, 992 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (3d Dept. 2014); 
Matter of Hawkins v. Travis, 259 A.D.2d 813, 686 N.Y.S. 2d 198 (3d Dept.), appeal dismissed, 93 
N.Y.2d 1033, 697 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1999); see also Matter of Moore v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
137 A.D.3d 1375, 26 N.Y.S.3d 412, 413 (3d Dept. 2016).  The Board was not required to give 
each factor equal weight and could place greater emphasis on the gravity of the inmate’s offenses.  
Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Furman v. Annucci, 138 A.D.3d 1269, 28 N.Y.S.3d 352 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Furthermore, an inmate has no 
Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence.  
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 
2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980).  The New 
York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not create 
a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-
76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper 
resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the 
propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth 
therein.  Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 
1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of 
Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested 
with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period 
of incarceration set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 
283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d 
Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any 
manner been resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 
1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
 
Appellant’s contention that “it is not clear from the transcript… if the Board misinterpreted 
his conviction” is unexplained and insufficient to disturb the decision.  The record reflects Appellant 
was convicted by plea of two counts of Murder in the second degree and he acknowledged the 
offenses – including that it was his intention to kill his father so he could steal things to sell – during 
the interview.  There is no indication in the record that the Board somehow “misinterpreted” his 
convictions.   
 
Appellant’s additional contention that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments 
to the Executive Law is likewise without merit.   The 2011 amendments require procedures 
incorporating risk and needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  
Executive Law § 259–c(4).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS 
instrument.  Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 
2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 
(3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th 
Dept. 2014).  However, the COMPAS was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs 
as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory 
factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that 
the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, 
including the instant offense.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  The amendments also did not 
change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether 
to grant parole, namely (1) whether “there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is 
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law”; (2) whether release “is not 
incompatible with the welfare of society”; and (3) whether release “will not so deprecate the 
seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, 
the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 
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N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board 
must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three 
standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 
990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 
N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 
N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  That is exactly what occurred here.   
 
Finally, the Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 
9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the 
denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 
N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 
435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 
(3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002).  
The Board addressed many of the factors and principles considered in individualized terms and 
explained those that ultimately weighed most heavily in its deliberations: namely, the instant 
offenses, Appellant’s disciplinary record, the COMPAS instrument and concerns about reentry 
challenges and plans. 
 
In conclusion, Appellant has failed to demonstrate the Board’s decision was not made in 
accordance with the pertinent statutory requirements or was irrational “bordering on impropriety.”  
Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000) (quoting Matter of 
Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980)). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
